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This Research Report examines the determinants of South African industrial firms' capital
structures. The report attempts to evaluate if a firm's preference for equity or debt capital
can be attributed to specific variables which may reflect its industry profile or operating
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A literature review, discussing both perfect and imperfect capital market conditions, is
included in order to determine if the premise of "variable influence" has academic support.
The variables found to have an influence on (non South African company) capital
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1. ~TRODUCTION
This Research Report examines the determinants of South African industrial firms'
capital structures. The report attempts to evaluate"if a finn's preference for equity
or debt capital can be attributed to specific variables which may reflect its industry
.'profile or operating structure.
The issue is examined in two main bodies. Firstly. literature on the debt-equity
debate is reviewed, and variables which have been found to influence capital
structure choice art' highlighted, Secondly, trends in South African industrial
companies' capital structures are calculated and tested against the variables which
have been found to influence capital structure choice.
The literature review details the potential benefits and risks of increased usage of
debt finance. The traditional view that there is an optimal debt to equity (gearing)
ratio which minimises a firm's cost of capital and maximises its value, as well as the
Modigliani and Miller assertion that capital structure is irrelevant in perfect capital
markets, are examined. Finally, studies which found specific quantifiable variables
which result in a firm having a higher (or lower) than average debt to equity capital
structure are discussed.
The literature review concludes that debt to equity ratios are likely to vary in
relation to a finn's debt capacity, the variability of its cash flows (operating risk),
the uniqueness of its product and its ability to obtain funds from unprotected
1
creditors. This supports the view that seemingly independent variables may
influence capital structure choice.
This report then selects a sample of South African industrial companies listed on
the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE). The research methodology employed is
discussed which includes an assessment of the constituents of debt and equity, the
sample selection criteria and statistical analysis methods. Relevant data are
extracted from annual financial statements and analysed in order to det'-'lmine
whether any trends are apparent for South African industrial companies' capital
structure. The predictive variables tested by this paper are regressed against debt
to equity ratios in order to assess the relationship between these variables and
levels of debt to equity.
The variables which are hypothesised to affect a firm's capital structure decision
are tested in sections 3 and 4 of this report. These hypotheses are detailed below:
• Debt to equity ratios are higher for firms with lower levels of secured debt to
total assets;
• Debt to equity ratios are higher for firms with higher levels of unsecured
creditors to total assets;
8 Debt to equity ratios are higher for firms with lower levels of operating profit
variance;
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• Debt to equity ratios are higher for firms with higher levels of tangible fixed
assets to total assets;
• Debt-equity ratios are higher for firms with higher oper ating profit margins;
"i)
.' Debt to equity ratios are higher for firms with higher levels of capital
expenditure;
• Debt to equity ratios are higher for firms with higher levels of fixed assets; and
• Debt to equity ratios are ~,:igherfor firms with higher levels of turnover.
(,
The sPIvey of South African listed companies concludes that there is a posttive
relationship between a company's debt to equity ratio and its turnover. The size of
a firm is hence the best \. tplanation of its debt to equity ratio.
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2. A SURVEYOtTHE RELEVANT LITERATURE
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I
I
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2.1 () THE ~,LA'nONSHIP BET~NEEN Fe ANCING AND
CJ
,\be existence of a relationship between financing and investment decisions is an
important concept in terms of this dissertation. If such a relationship does exist
then, as firms have differing investment needs and criteria, we would also logically
expect to find a relationship between a finn's debt to equity r~lio (its financing
declsion) and the type of investments it has made. The premise of variable
influ;;;11ceon capital structures is thus based on an inherent relationship between the
, JI
flnancing and investment ~ecisiol1S.
(,
Modigliani and Miller have proved that there is no relationship between a firm's
investment and financing decisions given the existence of perfect capital markets.
(Modigliani and Miller, 1958, pp 261-297). In practice capital markets are not
perfect.Notwithstanding this, Modigliani and Miller's view is important in order to
understand the capital structure debate and is hence discussed in greater detail in
this paper.
Correia et al define the primary responsibilities of financial management as
twofold: locating optimal investment opportunities as well as locating the funds to
finance these investments.
':'
"Financial management (is the) catalyst between investment opportunities
on the one hand and sources of finance on the other as reflected in the
balance sheet which shov.\s assets on the one hand and the financing of
these assets on the other." (1989)
Reekie also argues that there is an interrelationship between the investment and
financing decisions offering the logical premise that in order to evaluate projects
management requires the use of the cost of capital as a discount rate in Net Present
Value calculations or as ~ yardstick against which the Internal Rate of Return
should be measured. (Reekie et al, 1987). This would suggest that the financial
manager's financing and investment decisions are related. As investment decisions
for different firms vary, this view would support the argu ('ent that (at least an
element of) the financing decision, and hence capital structure, is explained in
,If
terms of the type of assets invested in and the man....er in which the firm operates.
5
2.2 ., CONSIDERATIONS IN RAISING DEBT FINANCE'\;
.) , \;
An obvious Objective in obtaining finance is to ot1tainfunds at the lowest cost. An
inyest6t or lender would assess his required return on these funds in terms of the
asieciated risk of the underlying investments and the firm's existing capital
structure. Finance can be raised in one or more of three broad ways which are
detailed below;
• long term capital markets (equity, preference shares, debt instruments);
• short ·term finance on money markets (often used due to seasonal or cyclical
reasons); or
• by retaining a portion of the company's profits
Management must decide on the level of debt to equity which it wishes to
maintain, as well as the type of debt finance it wishes to use. This policy may
depend on the risk profile which management decides to adopt and necessitates the
consideration of two main risk categories: fitstly, the risk inherent in the firm's
operations and its investments (the variability of its cash flows) and secondly, the
firm's financial risk as determined by its exposure to debt
6
2.2.1 THE ADVANTAGES OF DEBT FINANCE
Reekie et at (1987, p.95) highlight four reasons why management may prefer debt
to equity finance.
• Increasing borrowings can enhance shareholders' returns. If a firm's
,~.
Return on Assets (Operating Profits ar >1\ percentage of total assets) is
greater than its pre-tax cost of bOi",.h 115, it can achieve a higher
Return all Equity (attributable earnings as a percentage of shareholders
fubds) by maintaining a higher debt to equity ratio than a competitor
firm which has an equivalent Return On Assets. This is what is meant
by financial gearing, a term which aptly describes the firm's abilityto
increase returns to (and the value at) shareholr'ers by increasing
borrowings;
o Raising fundsthroug'id~t~allows the shareholders to maintain control
of the firm whilst still limiting their total investment;
• The smaller the equity proportion of the firm's total financing the
greater the transference of default risk to lenders; and
• A tax deduction is available on interest payments but not on dividends.
Thin means that after accounting for the tax subsidy debt is generally a
cheaper form of finance than equity.
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2.2.2 THE DISADVANTAGES OF DEBT FINANCE
• If a firm's Return On Assets is 10~~,Ierthan its pre-tax interest rate on
borrowings, exposure to debt reduces shareholders' returns;
• If interest payments cannot be met the finn IS likely to be ri~clared
insolvent and its assets liquidated; and
• Financial Risk thus increases as a firm makes greater use of debt
financing.
2.3 IS THERE AN OPTIMAL CAPITAL STRUCTURE?
Debt to equity ratios are more likely to differ between companies and
across industries if it can be argued that there is an optimal ca=ital structure
and consequently that the issue of capital structure is not irrelevant. There
are two distinct schools of thought: the Traditionalists who maintain that
an optimal capital structure does exist and that of Miller and Modigliani
who argue that in perfect capital markets a firm's capital structure is
irrelevant.
2.3.1 TRADITIONAL THEORY
The traditional approach to the debt equity debate assumes that an optimal
capital structure does exist and that the firm can increase its total value
through the judicious use of leverage. (Van Horne). The graph below
dReekie et al, 1987, p.129) illustrates this view.
i) -f/,,~raPh On~: Traditional Theory of Optimal Capital Structure
I)
CO$t of
Capital
(%)
II 1',
Debt- Equity Ratio (%J
An all equity financed firm would reduce its cost of capital as it initially issues, and
then increases, the debt component of its capital structure. As debt holders have
prior call to equity holders on a company's assets, their lower risk on the
camp arty's insolvency, is translated into a lower rate of return. However, as debt
levels continue to increase, the interest cover and hence the "cushion" against any
downturn in the firm's fortunes lowers and the risk of default increases. Thus debt
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holders require lin increasing return (albeit lower than that required by equity
holders) to compensate for increased financial risk.
This hnplies an optimal capital structure for the firm where Rand C intersect on
the above graph. This is where the benefits from increased levels of debt to equity
'I. 'are not (fffset by an increasing rate of return paid on borrowings and where the"C
cost of capital is minimised.
2.3.?) MODIGLIANI ANDMILLER; PERFECT CAPITAL MAHKETS
(/ Modigliani and Miller {1v'IM)argue that the value of the firm and its average cost
of caoital are independent of its capital structur s. They maintain that the firm
\\
cannot change its value by splitting its cash flows into different streams arguing
that value is determined by a finn's real assets and not by the securities which it
issues. Individual arbitrage ensures that a firm's value is derived from its Return 011
Assets, capitalised at <;t rate appropriate to firms in the same risk class.
Modigliani and Miller believe that the required return on equity rises as the debt to
equity ratio (and hence risk) increases and that this offsets any gains from cheaper
debt finance, Thus the average cost of capital remains constant and both the value
of the firm and its cost of capital is th"'.same as if the firm had remained ungeared.
This premise assumes perfect capital markets including:
• Readily available information at no cost;
10
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• No transaction costs;
• Rational investors;
• Absence of corporate taxes, as these are effectively a subsidy to borrowing
rates;
.. Each investor has the same expectation of earnings before interest for any finn;
• Business risk is deemed constant over time and independent of the debt to
equity ratio; and
• Individuals are able to lend and borrow money at the same rate as quoted
companies.
Graph Two: The Modlgliani Miller View of the Cost of Capital
(graph: Reekie ezc/, 1986, p.134)
Modigliani and Miller argue that the total risk for all security holders of a firm is
not altered by changes to its capital structure. Arbitrage by investors, who
substitute personal leverage for corporate leverage, will preclude substitute
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investments from selling at diffi.lrentprices in the same market. This ensures that
the total value of the firm remains the same regardless of its financing mix. Hence,
if'equally risky companies difler inmarket value and the debt to equity ratio, then
investors will sell shares in the higher valued firms and buy shares in the lower
valued ones. As ungeared firms are one of the options available to investors, the
cost of capital of all firms must equal the cost of equity in the all equity firm,
Brealy and Myers (1984:, p377) note that if debt policies were completely
irrelevant, debt ratios would vary randomly from fum to firm and industry to
industry. They suggest that debt policy does matter in well functioning capital
i/
markets which respond to taxation. and other factors such as the cost of
bankruptcy and financial distress. This would indicate the interaction of a fum's
investment and financing decisions
Debt financing has an advantage over equity finance in that interest paid to
debtholders is a tax deductible expense to the company>whereas dividends paid to
shareholders are not tax deductible. (Brealy and Myers, 1984, pp. 37}-381), The
table overleaf illustrates the tax advantage of debt finance by contrasting returns
received by investors in two firms which have equivalent earnings before interest
and tax The lonefirm is financed entirely by debt (Finn D) and the other entirely
by equity (Firm E).
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The net difference in the income streams of the two firms is the higher tax bill of
the ungeared firm. This is a result of the government having effectively paid the
assumed corporate tax rate of35% of Firm D's interest charge; representing a tax
shield on debt. Hence the value of the firm is equivalent to the value of an all
equity financed firm plus the present value of its future tax shields on debt.
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In South Africa debt finance offers an additional enhancement to after tax income,
as dividends distributed to shareholders attract a Secondary Tax on Companies
(STC) of25%. Interest on debt is free ofSTC.
The tax shield to debt finance supports the premise that there is an advantage to
increased levels <51debt finance. However, as all firms are not financed exclusively
by debt there is clearly an offsetting disadvantage to corporate debt.
As° a ..:firm increases the level of its borrowings it increases the possibility of
:financial~ess and bankruptcy. Investors demand higher returns from leveraged
firms in order to compensate for these risks. Hence, the value of the :firm is
equivalent to the value of an all equity financed firm plus the present value of its
future tax shields on debt less the present value of the potential cost of financial
distress and bankruptcy.
\\
'The graph overleaf illustrates that the optimal capital structure is a trade-off
between the tax advantages of debt and the cost of distress, Whilst the present
value of the tax shield mcreasea as a firm borrows more, the cost of financial
distress, which is initially insignificant, increases rapidly as debt becomes a more
significant component of the firm's capital structure. This will offset the tax
advantages of the corporate tax shield. The theoretical optimum is reached where
increases in the present value of tax savings due to additional borrowings is just
offset by increases in the present value of the cost of financial distress. (Brealy and
Myers, 1984, pp390w391)
14
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In South Africa debt finance offers an additional enhancement to after tax income,
as dividends distributed to shareholders attract a Secondary Tax on Companies
(fTC) of25%. Interest on debt is free ofSTC.
The tax shield to debt finance supports the premise that there is an advantage to
increased levels of debt finance. However, as all firms ~re not financed exclusively
by debt there is clearly an offsetting disadvantage to corporate debt.
As a fum increases the level of its borrowings it increases the possibility of
financial distress and bankruptcy. Investors demand higher returns from leveraged
firms in order to compensate for these risks. Hence, the value of the finn is
equivalent to the value of an all equity financed finn plus the present value of its
future tax shields on debt .less the present value of the potential cost of financial
distress and bankruptcy.
The graph overleaf illustrates that the optimal capital structure is a trade-oft'
between the tax advantages of debt and the cost of distress. Whilst the present
value of the tax shield increases as a finn borrows more, the cost of financial
distress, which is initially insignificant, increases rapidly as debt becomes a more
significant component of the fum's capital structure. This will offset the tax
advantages of the corporate tax shield. The theoretical optimum is reached where
increases in the present value of tax savings due to additional borrowings is just
offset by increases in the present value of the cost of financial distress. (Brealy and
Myers, 1984, pp390-391)
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Graph Three: Costs of Finan~~aIDistress
D
Brealy and Myers (1984, p.391)
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2.4 CRITICISM OF THE DEBT TO EQUITY RATIO AS A
MEANINGFUL MEASURE IN ISOLATIONo
t·p
Franks and Boyles (1979) discussed some limitations of the debt to equity ratio
which highlight the dangers of viewing this ratio in isolation:
• Interest cover may be a better indicator of the firm's financial risk. It provides a
better assessment of the finn's exposure to volatility in its earnings;
• Diversification of a firm complicates. comparison with other companies;
• Different accounting values would result in differing disclosure of asset and
debt values between companies;
• Differing financial year ends and resultant seasonal factors could affect the debt
to equity ratio;
• Window dressing of annual financial statements may affect the debt to equity
ratio; and
• Inflation's impact on asset valuations may not be accounted for if a firm does
not revalue its assets.
This Research Report accepts the above limitations but notes that the debt to
equity ratio is the most commonly used measure of capital structure in the
literature, and is hence an essential ratio in order to determine the applicability of
the predictive variables of capital structure found in other studies to South African
companies. The debt to equity ratio remains the best objective measure of capital
structure available to minority shareholders.
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2.5 VARIABLES WHICH INFLUENCE CAPITAL STRUCTURE
CHOICE
In this section this report discusses other studies in detail in order to highlight
those variables found to have an influence on (non South African) capital structure
choice. These predictive variables are then regressed against South African
industrial companies' debt to equity ratios in order to assess their applicability to
South Africa,
The predictive variables examined include the debt capacity of a firm's assets; the
existence of unprotected (unsecured) creditors; the uniqueness of a finn's products
or its operations; the variability of a firm's earnings; its growth plans and prospects
and the firm's size.
A discussion of applicable data against which the relevant variables may be tested
is highlighted as this forms the basis of the statistical research conducted in terms
of this report.
f
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2.5.1 ASSETS' DEBT CAPACITY
Chatterjee and Scott (1989, pp 283-309) tested the theory of optimal capital
structure against (amongst other factors) bankruptcy related costs. Their study
examined data from 12 industries and 237 corporations. and found that firms with
high fixed-asset intensities (measured by the ratio of tangible fixed assets as a
percentage of total assets) have higher levels of debt. This they attribute -~o the
"floor" which these assets create for security holders in the event of the firm's
bankruptcy.
This result, they believe, confirms inter-industry differences in debt ratios found in
studies (to which they refer) by Schwartz and Aronson (1967) and Scott (1972),
and explains the positive relationship between debt ratios and depreciation
uncovered in a study by Bradley, Gregg and Han Kim (1984). The authors explain
that the depreciation charge is an effective proxy for fixed assets.
Chatterjee et al (1989) conclude that an asset's realisable value explains why asset
intensive firms (such as hotel chains) have higher debt ratios than firms with few
physical assets such as advertising agencies, labelling this finding as "debt-
capacity II, They emphasise however that an optimal debt structure is less than the
maximum debt capacity of a finn's assets.
f
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Titman and Wessels (1988, p. 3) also refer to the potential "collateral value" of a
,
i
h--;
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flmlis assets. They note that there may be inherent costs in issuing securities about
which the firm's managers have better information than its outside shareholders.
Hence, issuing debt secured by assets with known values may be both easier and
less costly. Firms with assets which can be used as collateral may thus be expected
to take advantage of such Oh'fftunity and issue more debt
The Edgars Annual Report for the financial year ended 31 March 1993
innovatively (amongst South African corporate reports) contains express reference
to the concept of debt capacity:
"New investments have the capacity to sustain (either interest bearing or
interest free) liabilities. The nature and security of each asset category was
critically reviewed with bankers and the controlling shareholders.
\\
\\
Management has concluded prudently that each asset investment can
sustain liabilities in the following respective proprsrtions:
Fixed Assets 50%;
Stock 75%;
Debtors 66%; and
Cash 100%."
The report continues that "The unutilised capacity reflects the additional
liabilities which the year end asset base could support." P. 43).
19
At 31 March 1993, the group's debt capacity calculated on the above basis was
163%, whilst the group's actual d~utequity ratio was below this. This reinforces
" ': .,,: l,'
the fact that the maximum debt e....t'adty of a firm's assets will not necessarily be
its optimum debt ratio;
Test Data
Chaterjee and Scott (1989, p.283) §uggest the ratio of tangible fixed assets (is. a
percentage of total assets (fixed asset intensity) as art indicator of debt capacity.
Their research indicates a positive relationship between fixed asset intensity and
debt to equity ratios because of the floor these assets put under potential
bankruptcy costs to security holders.
Titman et al (1988, p.3) offer two indicators of a firm's debt capacity. Firstly, the
ratio of intangible t!S%ts to total assets, which they suggest has an inverse
relationship to a firm's debt capacity, This reflects that tangible assets only are able
to be used ascollateral for borrowings.
The second ratio offered by Titman et at (1988, p.3) is the sum of stock and
:;
)
"",
tangible fixed assets as a percentage of total assets. The ratio should be positively
related tc debt capacity as it takes cognisance of those assets which may be used as
collateral.
20
This Research Report tests for a positive relationship between tangible fixed assets
as a percentage of total assets and the debt to equity ratio. This ratio is effectively
the inverse ofTitman et aI's intangible assets to total asset ratio. th~ paper does
however also test the second Titman suggestion for a positive relationship between
the sum of stock and tangible fixed assets as a percentage of total assets and the
debt to equity ratio.
,.2.5.2 UNPROTECTED CREDITOR EFFECT
Chatterjee and Scott (1989, pp 283-309) found that in addition to debt capacity,
an unprotected creditor (or "wealth transfer") effect creates additional stimulus for
debt 'issn lice. By issuing secured debt, firms increase the value of their equity by
expropriating wealth fr0111 their existing unsecured creditors. Wealth is thus
transferre ,-:> protected and informed debtholders and ultimately to the
shareholders, who are able to issue secured debt at a lower coupon.
This premise is based on the existence of creditors (including trade creditors and
the receiver of revenue) who do 110t have access to the .nformation or to adequate
monitoring technology In order to react promptly to the issue of asset secured debt
and the related reduction in the potential value of their claims. These creditors may
not know a finn's debt policy at a specific time and related transaction costs may
prevent their coming forward to press their (small) bankruptcy claims in the event
of liquidation.
71
Firms which have higher percentages of assets which can be used as collateral may
be expected to take greater advantage of this opportunity (Titman and Wessels,
1988). The relationship between this argument and the rationale supportive of the
assets' debt capacity as an indicator of debt level, is hence evident.
Test Data
Chaterjee ci al (1989, p.307) suggest that unprotected creditors to total assets
provide a positive stimulus to the issue of debt, due to market imperfections such
as transaction costs and asymmetrical information.
This Research Report tests this theory using two ratios. Firstly, the paper tests for
a negative relationship between secured debt as a percentage of total assets and
the debt to equity ratio. Secondly, a positive relationship between unsecured
creditors as a percentage of total assets and the debt to equity ratio is tested for.
22
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2.5.3 UNIQUENESS
Titman and Wessels (1988, p.5) argue that debt levels are negatively related to the
uniqueness or specialisation 6f a firm's operations. They suggest that customers,
workers and suppliers of firms that provide unique or specialised products suffer
relatively ,high costs in the event of liquidation. These potentially high liquidation
'costs are relevant to a firm's capital structure decision. This argument is based on
(\
the premise t,hat a firm's workers and suppliers may have job specific skill and
capital' and that their customers may find it difficult to obtain service for their
unique produetrs) elsewhere.
Titman and Wessels' (1988) examination of the influences of capital structure
choice found uniqueness to be the strongest explanation of differences in inter-
g "
D
company debt to equity ratios.
I~, Test Data
Titman et al (1988, p.5) suggest a number of objective measurements of
uniqueness. These include higher expenditure on research and development; higher
levels of marketing as a percentages of turnover; and a lower rate at which
employees voluntarily leave their jobs as their skills are specialised.
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This report was unable to extract data for either of these three ratios from the
published annual financial statements which were analysed, due to the limited
disclosure requirements of the Companies Act and Generally Accepted Accounting
Principles (GAAP). Only three companies examined disclosed the amount which
was spent on research and development whilst none disclosed marketing
expenditure. The disclosure of the number of employees is also not a mandatory
requirement.
Hence, this report does 110tinclude the predictive variable of uniqueness in terms
of its assessment of factors influencing South African capital structure choice.
2.5.4 OPE~RATING RISK
Flath and Knoeber (1980, p. 99) tested cross-industry variations in debt to equity
ratios. Their study concludes that cross-industry variation in capital structure is
best explained by differences in industry operating risks. This, they argue, is due to
the reduced risk of generating sufficient cash flows to meet inter est requirements in
those industries which have lower operating risk. 'The risk of default is lower, the
cost of borrowing reduced and higher debt levels are prudent.
Franks and Broyles (1979) agree with this assertion, suggesting that debt to equity
ratios are higher for those firms whicu operate in industries which have lower
business risk.
i
1"
~
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Test I>~\ta
Flath et of (1980) believe that the variability (and hence uncertainty) of turnover is
\~:
the best indicator of such risk.
Titman et al (1988, p. 6) when postulating that debt to equity ratios may be a
decreasing function of earnings volatility, argue that the standard deviation of the
percentage change in operating income (which is the one earnings figure
L\ '
unaffected by interest earnings or charges) is a better measure of earnings volatility
than turnover.
This paper agrees with the rationale of Titman et at and tests for a negative
relationship between debt to equity ratios and earnings volatility, as measured by
the standard deviation of the ,)ercentage change in operating income.
2.5.5 GROWTH
i
i
~!
[
I
Titman and Wessels (1988, p. 4) suggest that there is a negative relationship
between a firm's future growth plans and its long term debt levels. This may be due
to the flexibility inherent in management's future investment decisions as well as
higher uncertainty about the magnitude and timing of the firm's future cash flows.
The effect could result in lenders insisting on higher financing rates.
25
Logic suggests that companies which have grown by cash funded acquisitions, may
well have temporary higher debt to equity ratios until the anticipated cash flow
benefits reduce borrowings to normal levels over time.
Indeed, Titman et al (1988) note evidence that the issuance of convertible debt
may reduce the required borrowing cost and that convertible debt ratios may be
positively related to growth opportunities.
Test Data
Titman et al (1988, p.4) suggest as an indicator of growth the ratio of capital
expenditure to total assets, which gives the percentage increase in +ttefirm's total
assets.
This paper tests for a relationship between capital expenditure (excluding amounts
spent on maintenance) as a percentage of total assets and the debt to equity ratio.
As a result of the above discussion both a positive and negative relationship is
tested for.
26
2.5.6 SIZE OF THE FIRM
Titman et al (1988, p. 6) note the logical expectation that relatively larger sized
firms will have higher debt to equity ratios. TIlls is due to two factors: Firstly,
direct bankruptcy costs constitute a higher proportion of a lower value finn's total
value ..As a result, liquidation costs are relatively higher which increases the cost of
issuing debt. Secondly, the diversified nature of relatively larger firms makes them
less prone to bankruptcy and the risk of default on debt is thus lower.
Test Data
Titman et al (1988) suggest that the magnitude of a firm's turnover is a measure of
its size. This paper tests for a positive relationship between levels of turnover and
the debt to equity ratio.
2.5.7 PROFITABILITY
Titman et at (1988, p. 6) note that a finn is more likely to raise capital from
retained earnings than issue debt. The past profitability of a firm and hence the
amount of earnings available to be retained would be an indicator of its capital
structure. The higher a firm's profitability the lower its debt to equity ratio is likely
to be. The default risk of lower profitable operations is higher and hence
borrowing costs are likely to be higher.
27
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suggested by Titman et al (1988, p. 6) as measures of profitability.
Test Data
Two ratios, operating income to sales and opetating income to total assets are
This paper tests for positive relationships between the ratio of operating income to
sales and the ratio of operating income to total assets to the debt to equity ratio.
2.5.8 TAXATION
The impact of taxation on the level of a finn's debt to equity ratio is a logical
premise as tax is effectively a subsidy to the cost of debt. Taxes hence imply the
existence of an optimal c.·;-ita1structure. (Flath et al, 1980, p. 113) The resulting
enhancements to a finn's earnings and its returns to shareholders are illustrated in
Table One of the Literature Review of this Research Report.
It is beyond the scope of this report to examine the impact of taxation 011 the debt
to equity ratio. This would entail analysis of data over several years in order to
properly reflect the influence of changes in the marginal rate of taxation on
borrowing levels. This report examines the factors which influence the debt to
equity ratio at a point in time. The advantage of debt is influenced by a firm's
marginal and not its effective tax rate and as the firms' sampled are (with one
exception) in a tax paying position the premise of tax influence on debt cannot be
assessed in this paper.
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3. RESEARCH'DESIGN
3.1 POPULATION AND RES~ARCH METHOD
This report examines data extracted from a sample of South African industrial
companies.listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE). The-debt to equity
~.c· ratio of each ~ompany is calculated and assessed with regard to the debt influence
theories discussed in the literature review. Applicable data (as suggested by
relevant authors) are; extracted from the companies' annual financial statements,
and are analysed using regression analysis in order to assess which theory (or
theories) best explain the determinants of capital structure choice in South Africa.
3.2 SAMPLE SELECTION
The sample is selected from the JSE Actuarial indices for industrial companies.
This is done in order to select, on an objective basis, the higher market capitalised
and hence more significant economic entities and also to ensure that a cross
spectrum of industrial companies is analysed. However, this does mean that the
sample is biased towards larger companies and different results may be obtained by
a study which is not thus skewed.
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A maximum offour companies per sector is selected in order of descending market
cm.pitalisatiOll.Where less than four companies constitute a sector index, all are
selected. Excluded nom the sample are those companies which began operations
during th.epast ten years and hence do not have a ten year earnings trend, as this is
one of the attributes examined in terms of the regression exercise. Also excluded
are those cOnlpanies which source, the majority of their earnings from. non South
African operations as these companies' debt to equity ratios m.aybe affected by
offshore tax structures and differing interest rate cycles which distorts direct
comparison with those companies which source the majority of their earnings
within South Africa. Finally, where accounting policies adopted for inflation distort
comparison with historical cost accounts, such companies are excluded.
Companies which are excluded are replaced in the sample, where applicable, by the
next highest market capitalised company in the relevant sector index,
1
i
I
I
I
A total of 41 industrial firms is selected. Appendix One lists the companies
included in the sample and contains details of those companies which are excluded
as well as the reasons for such exclusion.
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3.3 DEFTh'1TIONS
''i).e debt to equity ratio measures a company's total interest bearing liabilities as a
percentage of its shareholders' fimds. These terms are defined in greater detail in
the ensuing discussion which explains the basis on which the debt to equity ratio is
calculated in situations where confusion might arise.
3.3.1 LIABll.,ITY
Accounting Concepts (AC) 000, Framework for the Preparation and
Presentation of Financial Statements, defines a liability as: "A present obligation of
the enterprise arising from past events, the settlement of which is expected to
result in an outflow from the enterprise of resources embodying economic
benefits." (1990, Para 49)
The Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) has a similar definition:
"Liabilities are probable future sacrifices ofeconomic benefits arising from present
obligations of a particular entity to transfer assets or provide services to other
entities in the future as a result of past transactions or events." (FASB 6, 1985,
Para 35)
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3.3.2 EQUITY
"The residual interest in the assets of the enterprise after deducting all its
I
I
'1
I
Definitions .of equity (shareholders' funds) are based on the "elements directly
related to the measurement of finanpial position in the balance sheet (which are)
',I
assets, liabilities and equity" (AeOOO, 1990, Para 47), and include:
liabilities." (AeOOO, 1990, Para 49)
"The residual interest in the assets of an entity that remain after deducting its
liabilities." (FASS 6, 1985)
3.3.3 lNSTRUMEN'I'S wmcn :HAVE CHARACTERISTICS OF BOTH
FASB Concepts Statement No 6, Elements of Financial Statements, notes that
although the line between liabilities and equity is clear in concept it sometimes is
obscured in practice. (Para 55). Recent innovations in the financial markets have
tended to obscure the essential characteristics of an instrument. As a result,
applyf~Q;the definition above does not always provide clear cut answers as Some
financial instruments combine characteristics of both equity and liabilities. (FA.SB,
1990, Para 2)
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It is hence necessary to examine the relevant definitions in greater detail. Data
extracted from the companies included in this report's sample found potential
categorisation confusion to be restricted to the treatment of redeemable preference
shares and convertible debentures and the treatment of these instruments is
highlighted.
3.3.3.1 PREFE'RENCE SHARES J
I
1
1
1
!
I
I
Floquet (1988) suggests that preference shares should be treated as part of
shareholders' capital unless redeemable, in which case they are more analogous to
interest bearing debt and should be treated as such for ratio analysis purposes.
Tl.~ FASB recommendations (1990) agree with Floquet's view that non
redeemable preference shares be regarded as an equity instrument and that
preference shares redeemable at a fixed Jate or at some event beyond the control
of either party, should be regarded as debt. The calculation section of this. paper
has adopted this approach.
However. FASS advises a more scientific approac+ t'} redeemable preference
shares, where either party has control over redemption, noting two possible
methods for: determining classification These are the Governing Characteristics
Method and th~ With and Without Method. (FASB, 1990, p. 72).
i
~
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This Research Report uses the more objective Governing Characteristics method;
This method states that the instrument must be treated as either a liability or as
equity. If the shares are redeemable at the option ofthe company, such redemption
may never take place. As a result of this the criterion of a present obligation (in
order to be classified as a liability) is not met and the instrument is regarded as
equity. However, if the holder has the option to redeem the instrument the reJevant
char=•• ...rist1csof a liability do exist: the event (instrument issuance) has occurred
and a ;"esent obligation does exist.
The With and Without method recommends that part of the instrument should be
regarded as an equity instrument and part as an option (FASB, 1990, pp 72~73).
The option component should be regarded as debt if the holder has the right to
enforce the option. This recognises that in such situations a present obligation
exists due to a past event, namely the issuance of the instrument. However, the
option should be regarded as an asset if the company has the right to convert the
option.
:1.3.3.2 CONVERTIBLE DEBENTURES
Unlike preference dividends, the nOI1 payment of interest on convertible debentures
is likely to result in a company's liquidation. The argument om hence be made that
debentures, until converted, be treated as debt in all situations. (FASB, 1990, p.S8)
V If
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FASB further notes that whilst compulsorilyzconvertible debentures could be
treated as equity, debentures convertible ,Ij(6he option of either the holder or the
company coulz be split into two components. The valuation of the instrument is
the sum of the equity instrument and the underlying option, which is regarded as
either debt (where conversion is at the holder's option) or equity (where
conversion is at the company's option).
This report has treated compulsorily convertible debentures and debentures
convertible at the company's option as equity. Where the hclder has the option to
convert the debenture into equity the instrument is t\!~arded as debt.
o 0
3.3.4 DEFERRED TAXATION
The Accounting Practices Board recommends that "deferred tax should be
classified either as an asset or as a liability depending ~pon the nature of the timing
differences. II The Board rejects any suggestions that deferred tax should be
considered part of equity, or that the balance be ,-Jtsclosed between equity and
liabilities lias part of a so-called fourth element" to the accounting equatiolL.(AC
102, Technical Release, 1989).
J1i
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Where it can be expected that the deferred tax liability will arise it makes sense to
treat the balance as debt, but where it can be reasonably concluded that (a portion
of) the liability is unlikely to arise itmay make more sense to treat that amount as
equity as there will always be new tax allowances to replace those which are
reversing, The argument favours the inclusion of deferred tax as part of debt where
the partial method has been used. In situations where the comprehensive method
has been adopted, some merit lies in assigning part of'the balance to equity.
This report treats deferred tax as a liability in accordance with AC 102 and (more
importantly) in recognition that the inclusion of part of a comprehensive deferred
tax balance' in equity is impractical. The deferred tax balance is excluded ill tile
calculation of'the debt to equity ratio as it is an interest free liability
3.3.5 CASH
The practice of deducting interest bearing assets from interest bearing liabilities to
arrive at the numerator in the debt to equity ratio is well established. However,
figures in the group balance sheet are an aggregation of the group's investments in
its subsidiary companies, whilst its ability to access the cash resources held by
certain subsidiaries may be a matter 'beyond simply controlling these entities given
the probable existence of minority shareholders or the commitment of these funds
to future capital projects. Hence, this report does not reduce debt by the amount of
cash holdings.
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o3.3.6 BOOK VALliE OF DEBT
Debt is measured in terms of book value and not market value as the latter is
generally unavailable. Titman et at (1988, p.7) note however that there is no
reason to suspect any correlation between the capital structure determinants as
tested in this report and cross-sectional differences between market and book
values of'debt, Hence, no obvious bias should result from this misspecification,
I
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4. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
\
4.1 RESULTS
The relevant variables tested are regressed against debt to equity ratios. The
coefficients of the relevant independent variable are examined ill order to test the
hypothesis that the debt to equity ratio is positively related to that variable.
\,~
Ii
The hypothesis is tested against the null ~yPothesis that there is no significant
\
relationship between the debt to equity ratio ~ndthat variable,
The alternative hypothesis signifies direction and therefore a one tailed test is used.
\)
{i
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All tests are earned out at a O,011evel of statistical significance.
Details of'the tests and statistical results are contained below and definitions of the
relevant ratios are contained illAppendix Three ofthls report.
, I
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4.1.1 SECURED DEBT TO TOTAL ASSETS
To test the hypothesis that the debt to equity ratio will be greater for firms with
low levels of secured debt to total assets, the ratio of secured debt to total assets is
regressed against the debt to equity ratio. The results of the regression are
tabulated below.
39
A positive coefficient for the secured debt to total asset variable was estimated and
hence the null 11:rpQilieses, that there is no relationship between levels of secured
debt and the debt to equity ratio was accepted.
{,
j
4.1.2 UNSECURED CREDITORS TO TOTAL ASSETS
To test the hypothesis that the debt to equity ratio will be greater for firms with
high levels of unsecured creditors to total assets, the ratio of unsecured creditors
to total assets was regressed against the debt to equity ratio. The results of the
regression are tabulated below.
Rearession Results - Table Two
Results of Regression of the Ratio of Unsecured Creditors as a
Percenta e of Total Asset.sA ainstthe Debt-to E uit Ratio
Unsecured Credltnss to Total Assets
2 T~il
Si nificance
StalldMd T
Variable Coefficient Error Statistic
Constant 2799.3485
Unsecured Creditors ~O.2709893
535.4809 5.227728
0.164524-1.64711J 3
o
0.1076
R-Squared
AdjtistedR-Squared
Standard Error of regressioll'
Log Likelihood
Mean ofdepcndcnt variable
Standard Deviation of.dependent v..viable
Sum of squared residual
F-Statistic
Prob (Fsstatistic)
0.065039
0.041066
1469.713
-356.157
2002.488
1500.852
84242144
2.712976
0.107571
l·\'·It ;
II
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A positive coefficient for the unsecured creditors to total asset variable was
estimated and hence the null hypotheses, that there is no relationship between
levels of unsecured creditors and the debt to equity ratio was accepted.
40
. \
o
4.1.3 OPERA TlNG PROFIT VARIANCE
tn
o
To test the hypothesis that gearing will be greater for firms with lower levels of
operating profit variance, operating profit variance was regressed against the debt
to equityratio. The results of the regression are tabulated below.
Coefficient Error Statistie'
T ZTaH
Significance
Results of Regression of Operating Profit
Vadance A ainst the Debt to E uitv Ratio
Variable:
Variable·
1420.0256
0.0010253
Constant 237.2047' 5.9864983
0.00023J;2 4.3217447
o
0.0001
R_-Squafed.
Adjusted R~$quared
Standard Error ofregression
Log:Likelihood
Mean of dependent variable
Standard Deviation, of dependent variable
Sum orsquared residual
F-Statistic
Prob F-statistic)
0.323826
03064~G
124~~87
-349.5139
2002.48&
1500.852
60924830
18.67748
0.000103
A positive coefficient ff perating profit variance was estimated and hence the
null hypotheses, that thereis no relationship between levels of operating profit
variance and the debt to equity ratio was accepted.
II"I,
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4.1.4 TANGIBLE FIXED ASSETS TO TOTAL ASSETS
To test the hypothesis that the debt to equity ratio will be greater for firms with
higher levels of tangible fixed assets to total assets, the ratio of tangible fixed
assets to total assets was regressed against the ratio of debt to equity. The results
of the regression are tabulated below.
1193.1953
0.2339012
Statistic Signific
Regression Resllits - Tab_l_e_F_o_u_r .....__ -I
Results of Regression ofthe Ratio of Tangible Fixed Assets as a
Pereenta: e of Total Assets A ainst the Debt to E uit Ratio c
Variable:. Tan""g__ib:.....l.;;_e__F~ix:.....e_d_A_• .;;_ss:.....'e~ts;:__,~~~~_,__.~_4
Standard T 2 Tail
CoefficientVariable Error
Constant
Tan •.FixedAssets
R~Squated
Adjusted R-Squared
Standard Error. of regression
LogL!keUhood
Mean qfdependent variable
Standard Deviation of dependent variable
Sum of squared residual
F-Statistic
Prob(F ..statistic)
ance
5.5948:19 0.0155
1.956~.2~~. ,0..0575
0.089415
0.066066
1450.427
-355.6154
2002.488
1500.852
82045851
3.829594
0.057541
o
A positive but insignificant relationship at the 0,01 level was estimated for the
tangible fixed asset variable and hence the null hypotheses that there is no
relationship between levels of tangible fixed assets and the debt to equity ratio was
accepted.
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4.1.5 OPERATING PROFIT MARGIN
c
0(1
To test the hypothesis that the debt to equity ratio will be greater for firms with
higher operating margins, the ratio of operating profits to revenues was regressed
against the debt to equity ratio. The results of the regression are tabulated below.
Re resslon Results - Table Five
Results ef'Regression of-the Operating
MarghlA ainst the Debt to E uit Ratio
OPERATING MARGIN
Standard T 2 Tail
Error Statistic Si uificanceVariable Coefficient
Constant
Operating Margin
1934.548
0.0643013
469.41307 4.121206 0.0002
0.3833179 0.1677449 0.8677--~,....__~..:............:............:.........._'
R~SquareJ
Adjusted R-Sq1..lared
Standard Error of regression
Log Likelihood
Mean of dependent variable
Standard Deviation of dependent variable
Sum ofsqualed residual
F-Statistic
Prob (F.-statistic)
0.000721
~0.024902
1519.424
-357.5208
2002.488
1500.852
90037359
0.028138
0.867651
o
~~-------------------~~---------j
A positive but insignificant relationship at the 0,01 level was estimated for the
operating margin variable, and hence the null hypotheses that there is no
relationship between levels of operating profit margin and the debt to equity ratio
was accepted.
\j
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4.1.6 CAPITALEXPENDITURE
To test the hypothesis that gearing will be greater for firms with higher (or lower)
levels of capital expenditure, the ratio of capital expenditure to total assets was
regressed against the debt to equity ratio. The results of the regression are
tabulated below.
r-- ---._-~-_?7"-=R'"'-e:.<g2;;.r..;;;es::.:;s;:c.;io:..:n:..cR:..-· ••.;;:.cs:...;cU..;;;lt:.;:.s--....::;;.,1.~bleSix. .• . ._ .. _.. ~
Results Qf1{egloession ,Mthe Ratio of Capital E",,-peJlditureto.( .
1-----~ '--~T....;:o.....;ta.;_IAssets Agaim;t the DebUo Equity Ratio I
Variable; Capital Expenditure
Standard T 2 Tail
r--~_V:.._a::.:;l..;;;oia~b:.;:.le.;;:..~ __ ~C~o.;;:.ct:.;:.fi:.;:.c::.:;ie.;;:.n~t" E::.:;:..crf:.._·o:.;:.r_._~S.;;:.ta::.:;t.;;:.is:.;:.ti:.;:.c~~S:.;:.i~J.;;:.li.;;:.fi~ca::.:;n:..cc:.;:.e~
Constant 1964.5626 338.34927 5.8063157 0
QapitalExpenditurc 0.0501397 0.3188538 0.1572497 0.8759
ruSquared
AdjustedR-Squared
Standard Errol' of regression
Log Likelihood
Mean of dependent variable
Standard Deviation of dependent variable
Sum of squared residual
F-Statistic
Prob (F..statistic)
0.000634
-0.024991
1519.491
-357.5226
2002.488
l500.852
90045228
0.024727
0.875859
A positive but insignificant relationship at the 0,01 level was estimated for the
capital expenditure variable and hence the null hypotheses that there is no
relationship between levels of capital expenditure and the debt to equity ratio was
accepted.
o
0: (l I)
o
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Regressi~ll k.cS"ults~Table Seven
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4.1.7 FIXEDASSETS
To test the hypothesis that the debt to equity ratio will be greater for firms with
higher levels of fixed assets, the level of fixed assets was regressed against ~hedebt
to equity ratio. The results of the regression are tabulated beiow.
"
Standard T
Variable . Coefficient Error Statistic Si nificanee
Constant
Fixed Assets
1008.1537 763.60392 1.3202573 0.1944
0.1792192 0.1311324 J,3667036 0.1795--~~~--~~----~--------~
!;t.;
f
R-Squared
Adjusted R~Squared
Standard linor ofregression
Log Likelihood
·Meartof dependent variable
Standard Deviation of dependent variable
SUlll of squared' residual
F-Statistic
Frob (F-statistic)
I 0.0'457051
0.021236
1484.831,
...356.5766.. \
2002.488
1500.852
85984167
1.867879
0.179546
(,,,,,:-
o
p
A positive but insignificant relationship at the 0,01 Ievel was estimated for the
fixed asset variable and hence the null hypotltc: ~s that there is no relationship
between levels of fixed assets and the debt to equity ratio was accepted.
45
.:._,
4.1.8 TURNOVER
To test the hypothesis that the debt to equity ratio will be greater for firms with
higher levels of turnover, turnover is regressed against the debt to equity ratio. The
results ofthe regression are tabulated below.
Regression Results - Table Ei ht
Results of Regtession of Turnover Against the Debt to Equity Ratio
Variable! Turnovel'
Standard
Variable Coefficient
,2 Tan
Error. Statistic Si ~,~ificance
259.13381 5.594819 0
5.11E-06 3.5334198 0.0011
T
Constant
Turnover
1449.8068
1.80E-05
0.242494l
0.223076
R..:8quared
A,.djustedR-
Squared
Standard Error of regression
Log Likelihoqd
Mean of dependent variable
Standard Deviation of dependent variable
Surn ofsquaredresiduaJ
F-Statistic
].>rob(F-statistic)
1322.901
-351:8421
2002.488
1500.852
68252631
1, 2.48506
il
'
G.00I073
'--i~'__ '
A positive and significant relationship at the 0,01 level was estimated for the
turnover variable and hence the alternative hypothesis that there is a relationship
between the level of turnover and the debt to equity ratio was accepted.
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4.2 CONCLUSION
A number of variables were identified in the literature to support the premise that
debt to equity ratios are likely to ':y between companies in imperfect financial
markets, Variables identified in the literature indicate that higher debt to equity
ratios are likely for those firms which have:
• Assets with a higher debt-capacity;
" Lower variability of cash flows (operating risk);
I' G
o
';:,;);:;:
Co
o Cf
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• Products which are less unique;
• Higher funding of assets by unprotected creditors;
e Higher levels of capital expenditure (growth prospects);
I' A greater size. This can be measured in terms of a company's turnover; or
• Greater levels of profitability.
Hence, the literature review concludes that an element of the debt to equity ratio is
attributable to the firm's operations.
D ,.
D
I' 0
Q
When testing companies listed on the Johannesburg Stodk Exchange to determine
\
\
the applicability of the variables identified in the (non Sou,h African) literature only
one variable was found to influence the debt to equity ratio\\.The other variables
were found; to have an insignificant influence. The survey of South African listed
companies! debt to equity ratios concludes that a firm's size, measured in terms of
its turnover, is the best explanation for its debt to equity ratio, 'This corresponds to
the theory of Titman et al (1988),
o-.
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5 APPENDICES
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.•........••••.... ..... •••••....•.' . APPENDIX ONE •. ..• ..•. . .••..•. •.•...•.• \
OMP.•••A.•.••..•.NIES.' IN.·••.C.·.•.L.UD-en IN S.AMPLEANDREAS.·.ONS FOR .•.EXCLU..S1.ON..-OF '\
COMPANIESli'ROMSAMPl;;E ORl?ORLIMITATIONS OF SAMPLE SIZE. \
~---~'--~----~--~-----T~'\--~~~~------------------------~---~: Sector lludex C()Ilstituellts Al!\cepted:,v Reasons For Exclusiolll Limitation of
r--' .•..itl\PoRltl~\tion Exd ...u_d_e..;..d_:)t. -+-S..;..~....m_l L.)r .....le_S_i_z...e ---_--;.
Beverage~~Hotel and
Leisure
}(ersaf .~
! \
South African Breweries
(SAB)
3 M"Net .)Q' No ten year profit history
t--_4 .........N",;.·.. ./A .;._· ---'r .........---.~+__-x_.\__---t_-S-ec-t-or--irl-dex .has .only three cOl1stitue~L_
:Building, COl1struction
and Allied '
Grinaker
LTA
3 Pretoria Portland Cement
(PPC) .
I 4 Anglo Alpha x Inflation accounting distorts comparability
5 N/A . '. . '(1-..:-.__ --t x__ - ....+-S-e-ct__or index has only four constituents ..-
ChemIcals; Oil an:.d'
Plastics ':,
r:;Engen 1\
2 Sasol
3 . N/A,_--........-------\ . _,-__, ...........
Clothing, Fobtwearnnd
Textiles
1 Atnshoe
2 Conshu
3 Da Gama
..4 Romatex~-------------~------~--~..,._""""",__--~--~,-~--------~--------------~
I
I
.No ten year profit hi~9lY onto I
_,I( I--~ector index has (,nil' two constit~~
..j
!
,.
\ Ij
.,fi
o
IJ
oSector lIndex Censtitnents AcCel)ted:../ Reasons FOI' E)tclusionl Limitation of
in Population Exeludedrx Sample Size
Electl'ouics and Electrical
1 Alteeh
2 Fintech
Information Service Group
(IS G)
4 Powertech
S. Rennert
6 Telemetrix
No ten year profit history!? '11
\\
'\\
);
//
Bulk of earnings are Non South African
Standard··'En.£!_neer.i!!:.r;,g__ -t-_, -./---:I-------~ --------..-...;
Food
Delfoods
Hunt, Leuchars & Hepburn
(HLH)
premier Group
TigerOl:l:ts
n~ T,ongaatHullet
.,Fm'nit.moe, 'Housebolds
and Allied
Afeol ./
2 Elerine -r:
3 JD Group .)C No ten year profit history
4 N/A ~. ,-t-__ .)C__ -+_S_e__ct_o_l·_in_d_exhas only three constituents
Engineering
1'. Afrox
Dorbyl
Hudaco
4
1
Motors
Gentyre
Toyota
3 N/A
Pap~\rmld Packaging
Consol I
2 Nampak
3 Sappi
4 N/A
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x
Btffk of earnings are Non South African
:, -
S . d h 1- . I
, ector m ex as " two "".
Sector index has only three constituents J
o
r •.
i
I
l
~
l
I
I
r '
,~
--o·------·'-~<r'-' '~;:r-:-'~'~-- ...~,...,.- ~,..,...._-~--..."..,._.~. . ~ ...~- ._
o
Sector IIndex Constituents Ac~epted:.;'
Excluded» ,\I;
Pharmaceutical and
Medical
1 Adcock Ingram
2 SA Drug
3" Premier Pharmaceutical
4 NlA
'0
el'
II
(!
Pdllting and PubJi~hing
Argus
Times·M,edia(TML)
N/A
Steeland Allied
J'Iighveld
Iscot
N/A
../
../
.Ie
.;'
../
x
../
../
./
../ c .
Sector index has onl three constituents
Sectorindex has only two con~tituen_ts__
Secterindex has onl two cQnstitueijts
Stores
Edgars
Fos,chini
Pep~or
PicklllPay {PlK,.....);..;..__ -_+-_,__.....-.-.:..+-__ ----- - __ -l
1'tansportatil~n
Trencor
Unitran II
N/A '.' :,
1'\\\
2
3 Sector index has only two Gonstiwe._nt_s__ --I
Notes:
Sa.mple selected per sector indices at 31 July 1993 and share prices at that date
Fourindex companies per sector were selected
• Where this\was not. possible .details have been included above.
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. APPENDIX TWO.. ...
DATASUMMARY
NUMBEFt 1. 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 I')
COMPANY SAB Kersaf Grinaker LTA PPC Sasol Romatex Da Gama
GEAR1Nl:; RAtiO 63.8% 24.8% 16.9% 34,9% 10.6% 27.7% 3.9% 2.2%
RATIO: 1 45% 72% 12% 37% 53% 72% 42% 33%
2 7% 1% 2% 4% 3% 2% 2% 2%
,3 28% 20% 59% 54% 14% 14% 28% 15%
4 21779.2 2026.9 2278.1 1614.0 884.6 8247.4 707.5 254.1
.J) 15% 12% 8% '8% 18% 14% 11% 9%
!", I) 11% 2Wo 3% 3% 22% 24% a% 10%
7 499.5 83.3 32.4 9.3 12.9 174.0 8.3 13.5
~) 8 e:% 74°/Q 46% 48% 61% 81% 60% 68%
I' 9 3.8% 13.0% 4.3% 11.0% 0.5% 13.2% 2.4% 0.0%J
"
NUMBEf~ 9 1.0 11 12 13 14 15 16
COMPANY Conshu Amshoe Altech Powertech Reunert Fintech Afro)( Dorbyl
, GEARING RATIO 24.H% 43.2% 0.1% 7.5% 9.5% 1.2% 1'5:Wo 26.7%
\. RArIO: 'I 22% 16% 14% 28% 24% 5% ' 67% 42%,.
:2 0% 6% 0% 1% 0% 0% 7% 1%
$ 31% 18% 26% 36% 51% 48% '18% 29%
4 630.5\ 247.2 1.023.0 1092;9 2277.6 e02.2 1113.2 2977.1
5 14% 11% lSD/\) 17% 17% 10% 17% 9% 0
6 8% 7% 13% 10% 9% 5% 20% 5%
7 1S.7 8,3 7" 27.6 57;0 16.7 37.4 19.2 O?.""
{I 53% 46% 31% 58% 54% 36% 74% 70% c Q\ 0
9' 1.4% 6.5% 18.9% 23.9% 8. aWl) 1.5% 9.0% 4.2%
":::_.,":"_\
NUMBER 11 ', 18 19 2.0 21 22 23 24
COMPANY Hudaco St~\Odard 'Premier Tig¢r HLH Tonqaat Afeal Ellerine~ --- 38.7%GfE.8RING RATIO 23.2% 11.5% 14.2% 13.7% 20.7% 1..0% 22.9%
RATIO: 1 18% 33% 31% 34%,. 22% 56% 21% 14%
2 1% 3% 0% 6% 1% .7% 1% 0°/0
3 40% 34% 41% 31% 10% 20% 29% 17%
4' 562.6 794.9 10151.1 10039.4 758.4 3872.8 788.6 757.7
5 20% 15% ~2% 13% 8% 9% 8% 20%
6 11% 10% 4% 7% 15% 7% 5% 15%
""l 7 12.6 39.2 59.4 105.9 42.3 26.9 5.1 18.5 1,,\\'8 67% 66% 62% 60% 27% 72% 39% 23% • "
9 3.6.6% 1.1% 4.9% 4.7% 3.3% 1.9% 0.0% 0.9%
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APPENDIX nN0 (ctd)
DATA SUMMARY
NUM6ER.
COMPANY Gentyre
25
GEARING R.ATIO 25.3%
32%RATIO: 1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
:9
0%
14%
521.4
8%
7%
8.2
48%
10.8%
26 27 28 29 30 31 32
Toyota consot Nampak .:"ppj Adcock SA Drug Argus
4404% 12.0% 16.0% 4";.3% 0.0% 5.1% 11.9%
43% 40% 46% _-73% 33% 27% 23%
14% 6% ('II" , 13% 0% 3% 2%
20% 29% ·~U 11% 36% 42% ~l%
3452.6 2165.7 4543.( 4677.0 971.5 1835.7 1653.0
8% 19% 20% 5% 27% 11% '14%
4% 13% 11% 9% 16% 7% 9% Q,
60.8 81.6 50.1 170.2 36.3- 15.4 23.8 \l
67% 65% 71% 81% 52% 55% 39%
1t.6% 20.2% 3.9%) 12.4% 5.1% 4.1% 10.7%
.:
NUMBER 33 34 35 .ar 37 38 39 40
COMPANY ! TML Highveld tscor Edgjt. Qchirli Pepkor PIK Trencor
GEARING RATIO 24.2% 11.4% 35.7% 36.4 34.9% 12 ..7% 1.2% 5.5%
RAtIO:-1 9% 49% 62% 15% 10% 26% 34% 12%
2 0% 0% 0% ·4% 2% 4% 0% 4%
i 3 24% 1ft% 14% 40% 32% 54% 66% 13%
4 348.3 1488.8 8825.1 3175.9 1161A 7763.9 6423.5 740.6
5 22% 1% 5% 26% 25% '10% 12% 16%
6 15%, 1% 6% 13% 19% 3% 2% 26%
7 23.9 159.4 89.7 98.2 51.7 55.1 11.9 46.7
8 10% 63% 83% 43% 33% 69% 68% 18%
9 13.8% 3.6% 2.4% 2.6% 6.7% 6.8% 3.5% 11.2%
NUMBER
COMPANY
41
unttran
22.3%
69%
12%
18%
357.2
14%
16%
14.1
72%
13.4%
GEARING RATIO
RATIO: 1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
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APPENDIX THREE
l . DEFINITIONS OF ABOVE RATIOS .. .:
RatiO!;: De(jnitiolt
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
Tangible Fixed Assets! Total Assets.
Secured Debt! Total·Assets
\LUnsecured Creditors. / Total Assets
"~furnover
Operating Profits' Total Assets
0perating Profit.Margin
Operating Profit Variability
(Fixed Assets + Stock) ITotal Assets
Capital Expenditure / Total Assets
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